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Negotiating Under the Security Dilemma A Loss-Framed Approach to the
Question of Cyprus
Abstract
The present study introduces a revised adaptation of the “ethnic security dilemma” theory to explain the
nature of antagonisms between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in negotiations for resolving the Cyprus
Question. The proposed theory accounts for security positions adopted by parties under conditions of
fear and uncertainty. The indistinguishability of offensive-defensive positions and the perceived windows
of opportunity have turned the negotiating process into a competitive cost-benefit problem marked by
their distinct security considerations. Furthermore, the study develops a loss-framed negotiations model
to illustrate likely choices when perceived costs outweigh the importance of prospective gains. The
analysis concludes that although parties could be better off by cooperating, suspicion and distrust
encourages defection by creating fears of prospective losses with regards to security.
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Negotiating Under the Security Dilemma:
A Loss-Framed Approach to the Question of Cyprus
Pavlos I. Koktsidis
Posting on his personal web-calendar, Stephen Saideman describes how Barry Posen
moved on first to publishing a theoretical piece on the ethnic security dilemma (Saideman,
2015). Openly regretful of his remissness for not publishing it first, Saideman admits that
Posen’s more popular version of the ethnic security dilemma has continued to shape how people
think about ethnic conflict today. Had it been for Saideman’s perceived notion of the ethnic
security dilemma (ESD) to dominate theoretical literature on the subject, we would have talked
less of ethnic dilemmas as principally seen through Posen’s “civil war battlefield” lens, and
more about the political content and ramifications of inter-group competition, which according
to Saideman, is not (only) for terrain and neighbourhoods, but for control of government,
legitimacy and for the state’s coercive apparatus (Saideman, 2015).
Despite an abundance of valuable descriptive and prescriptive scholarly work on the
question of Cyprus, the conflict’s protracted dynamic calls for the adoption of a deeper
explanatory approach to the central “problem of conciliation” within its original competitive
framework. This article adopts Saideman’s innovative yet unrefined theoretical proposition
to the conflict in Cyprus and makes a twofold contribution to the study of ethnic conflict in
Cyprus and to the study of conflict resolution at large. First, the analysis projects the security
dilemma in Cyprus as a key reason why negotiations have not yet worked there, and exhibits
how aspects of the security dilemma, consolidated through the major active phases of conflict
in Cyprus, continue to hold firm, and how these aspects encourage competition over security.
Second, the analysis presents an assessment of options in strategic policy-making illustrating
more clearly the difficult exchanging of established rights with prospective gains or
inducements due to the prevailing insecurity and suspicion that originates from the security
dilemma. For doing so, the present work sheds some light on the unjustly sidelined influence
of “security perceptions” as reflected on the attitudes adopted by the negotiating parties in
Cyprus. Under the veil of security dilemma, and taking into account each side’s stated
political goals and positions, the analysis sets up a framework that allows for assessing the
perceived utility of strategic options available to the negotiating parties.

The study embarks on a slightly refitted version of the ethnic security dilemma in
order to explain more accurately the limitations posed by the distinct security considerations
and priorities held by competing groups in Cyprus, and moulds the concept of the security
dilemma in a way that produces a comprehensive account of the security considerations that
complicate the reaching of an agreed settlement in Cyprus. This theory begins with an
analysis of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict as reflected during negotiations by
transferring its basic logical tenet, the dilemma between offensive and defensive attitudes and
responses, to the Cypriot political context. The study presents a number of perceived
security gains and losses for each side resulting from decisions to comply with, or defect
from, an agreed settlement. Using a loss-framed negotiations approach in which prospective
losses are esteemed higher than gains, the study estimates possible reactions and decisions
during negotiations.
The Ethnic Security Dilemma
Barry Posen was the first one to use Herz and Butterfield’s “security dilemma”
(Butterfield, 1951; Herz, 1951), a concept from the realist tradition of international relations,
and adopt it to the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly
find themselves newly responsible for their security (Posen, 1993a). Driven up by his deepseated conviction that most analysts of the early 1990s were inclined to the view that most of
the trouble (i.e., with ethnic conflict) lies “either in the specific nature of group identities
(constructivism) or in the short-term incentives for new leaders to “play the nationalist card”
to secure their power (instrumentalism),” Posen urged for the need to “understand the
security dilemma, as reflected onto the competitive relations between groups, and examine its
consequences” (Posen, 1993a, p. 29).
According to Posen, the collapse of multi-ethnic states can create conditions
equivalent to an emerging anarchy resulting from the lack of effective central government
control, leaving thus the numerous ethnic groups within the state to provide for their own
security and to make judgements as to the intentions of other ethnic groups (Posen, 1993a;
Van Kuppevelt, 2012). The origin of each security dilemma is clearly described in
Butterfield’s, Herz’s and Jervi’s core assertion that “what seems sufficient to one state’s
defence will seem, and will often be offensive to its neighbours…and because neighbours
wish to remain autonomous and secure, they will react by trying to strengthen their own
positions, even if they have no explicit evidence of expansionist inclinations” (Butterfield,
1951; Herz, 2003). Based on this typical assertion, Posen reiterates that “what one does to

enhance one’s own security causes reactions that in the end can make one less secure”
(Posen, 1993b, p. 116 & p. 104).
Under this premise, cooperation to mute these competitions can be difficult because
someone else’s “betrayal” may leave one in a militarily weakened position (Posen, 1993b, p.
28). In order to justify the distinctiveness of ethnic groups in their rivalling security
considerations, Posen explains that “the groupness” of ethnic groups with strong national
identities characterised by religious, cultural, and linguistic cohesion, and coming out of
collapsed regimes, give each of them an inherent offensive military power” (Posen, 1993b, p.
30).
Posen argues that the security dilemma may become particularly intense under three
major conditions: i) when offensive and defensive purposes are indistinguishable, making it
difficult for groups to determine whether their neighbouring groups are a threat; ii)
superiority of offensive over defensive action such as when one group is perceived to possess
more effective offensive capabilities (weapons, large armies, or ethno-geographical
advantages such as “ethnic islands” which can be mobilized on the spot and in times of need),
and finally; iii) when windows of opportunity exist at a time when emerging groups calculate
their current position relative to each other and make judgments about their relative power in
the future expectations for external military intervention (Posen, 1993a, p. 111).
The following parameters are extremely relevant for exploring the indistinguishability
of group intentions, the nature of superiority, and the existing windows of opportunity,
helping parties to determine the nature and severity of the ethnic security dilemma: i) Group
cohesion; ii) History of rivalry and/or armed clashes; iii) Presence of isolated “ethnic
islands;” vi) Presence of small bands of fanatics; v) Anticipated shifts in relative power; vii)
Expected intervention of allies (creates offensive incentives for favoured group), and viii)
Large number of conflicts and crises in the international environment (Posen, 1993a).
Putting all these together, Posen emulates a micro-framework for group-conflicts in which
conceptual notions and conditions interplay, starting with the adopted notion of anarchy and
fear, assuming a lack of expansionist or malign intentions and stepping towards an actionreaction spiral that can drive groups to preventive or pre-emptive actions as a result of the
indistinguishability between offense and defense leading to a self-defeating result
(Mearsheimer, 2001).
Firstly, the source of the security dilemma is anarchy or lack of a higher coercive
authority. Second, it requires uncertainty and fear over others’ intentions to do harm in the

anarchical situation. Faced with the condition of existential uncertainty in an anarchic world,
involved parties have to decide whether perceived military developments are for defensive or
self-protective purposes only, or whether they are for offensive purposes (Booth & Wheeler,
2008). Hence, they are faced with the difficult choice to decide if they should interpret the
intentions of another actor as aggressive, and thus adopt a stronger security posture in
response, or if they should view them as defensive, and thus exercise restraint to assuage
their neighbour’s security fears (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p.30). Thirdly, the situation has an
unintentional origin. Parties presumably hold benign intentions to each other and no one
wishes to engage in confrontational strategies.
In theory the application of the security dilemma to intra-state conflict by Posen is to
a certain extent successful, as it matches the original interstate security dilemma. Yet
Posen’s parameters and conditions are solely designed for explaining group decisions to use
preventive military force against other groups in a climate of perceived threats, fear, and
uncertainty. However, core parts of Posen’s theoretical model can be somewhat transmuted
to serve as a framework for calculating decisions regarding problems of security in a nonbattlefield context, where notions of anarchy and self-help, fear, mistrust, and the
indistinguishability of offensive over defensive intentions conveyed by groups, are most
crucial.
Following the initial attempt by Posen, several authors tracked his assumptions that
security dilemma would be an effective concept to explain ethnic conflict. Authors like
Stuart Kaufman (1996a, 1996b, 1994), Paul Roe (2006, 2004, 2001, 2000, 1999), Erik
Melander (1999), William Rose (2000), Chaim Kaufmann (1996), Shiping Tang (2009), and
Carter Johnson (2015) have all, in varying ways, used the interstate theory of the security
dilemma to explain intra-state and ethnic conflicts. While these authors still perceive the
security dilemma as a useful concept for explaining the outbreak of ethnic conflict, they
critique each other on the “failure to operationalize the security dilemma in terms of its
original Butterfieldian conception” according to which states are drawn into conflict despite
their benign motives, due to fear and uncertainty over the others’ intentions (Roe, 1999, p.
200). However, when we examine the applications by the authors Posen, Kaufman,
Melander and Roe, we find that they do not uphold all aspects of the security dilemma theory
in their applications of the security dilemma (Posen, 1993a; Kaufman, 1994; Melander, 1994;
Roe, 1999).

In fact, as they attempt to apply the concept, which was originally focused on
interstate relations, it appears that the concept does not always fit to the purposes of studying
ethnic conflict (Van Kuppevelt, 2012). This essentially useful concept requires considerable
readjustment to be made more reflective of the multi-layered (group-national-regionalinternational) micro-dynamics of ethnic conflict and to expand its explanatory potential to a
stage beyond the mere outbreak of violence. While these authors discuss the case of former
Yugoslavia, they have different definitions and different approaches to explain the outbreak
of conflict with the security dilemma. It appears that all authors refer to the original concept
of Butterfield and Herz, but acknowledge that in order to operationalize the concept within
an intra-state setting, the concept has to be adapted to successfully account for intra-state
conflicts. While each author took a different approach, their attempts have proven that the
concept has to be adapted so drastically that it no longer complies with the original concept.
This, however, should not be necessarily considered an error of capital importance, let
alone a skewing diversion annulling the theory. Given the tactical peculiarities and
differentiating aims and dynamics of ethnic politics, compared to the more comprehensible
power-struggles and grand strategies upheld by states and superpowers, we may easily regard
well-structured theories on strategic behaviour as impossible, or at least unsuitable to
robustly explain or predict the fluid and subtle nature of competitive ethnic politics. Yet, for
as long as security questions are brought forth in relations between rivalling ethnic groups,
there will be efforts to organize and operationalize behaviour so as to understand the ways
groups, and their representatives, may think or react.
Going beyond the strict military manifestations of the security dilemma, ethnic
groups appear to be influenced by the same deep-cutting security considerations during
negotiations. Interestingly, despite the adversarial calculations adopted by rivalling groups,
such as those entailed by most security dilemma theorists, interethnic relations are not always
or necessarily expressed through a strict zero-sum formulation, although many conflicts
present elements of entrenchment and intractability. Nonetheless, questions of “fear and
trust” predominate amongst politicians and their ethnic constituencies when it comes to
securing access to power and government control. Therefore, it is worth investigating how
the incurring [real or perceived] excess of fear creates an evolving trust deficit that produces
vital security concerns for the competing groups.
Drawing from empirical evidence on the subject, Saideman’s critique pinpoints the
“strictly physical notion of the security dilemma, i.e., vulnerability to armed attack” that

Posen was principally interested in (Saideman & Zahar, 2010, p. 3). Indeed, Posen’s
facsimile reproduction of a classic international relations concept confines the utility of
security dilemma within its strictly defined original military framework. Of course, neither
Posen nor any other scholars have precluded the expansion of the security dilemma to
political decision making processes. William Rose recognizes that Posen’s hypotheses
emphasized military issues apparent during the emergence stage of conflict, and therefore
decides to move ahead with new additions to the theory that focuses more on the politicaldiplomatic relations between groups (Saideman & Zahar, 2010, p. 3; Rose, 2000, p. 4).
By his account, Rose puts forth a number of hypotheses addressing the difficulties
imposed by the security dilemma through a political perspective including the adoption of
fait accompli tactics in inter-group diplomatic relations, “blame-shifting,” lack of
commitment and honouring of agreements, concealed or secretive political strategies, and
unconditional alliance building. These ideas, according to Rose, offer clues about ethnic
political relations when the security dilemma is intense, including reasons for the actions and
their probable consequences (Rose, 2000, p. 22). This so-called “belligerent diplomacy”
represents the motif to acquire military, political and economic elements of power, and the
struggle to provide means for collectivities to protect their interests (Rose, 2000, p. 22). For
example, under an intense security dilemma, ethnic groups will be more keen to adopt “red
line” tactics for key policy demands or propound a fait accompli in order to provide
themselves with security assets (Rose, 2000, p. 24). Yet Rose acknowledges that groups will
take hostile actions just because they have a conflict of interest, even if the security dilemma
is not acute and this is crucial for understanding confrontational behaviour during
negotiations (Rose, 2000, p. 24).
Moreover, the assumption that groups hold benign rather than malign intentions is at
least questionable, if not naïve, not just because groups in conflict become fully aware of
their competitive interests through formal and informal channels of communication, but
because they often clearly decide to act maliciously in order to enhance them. A very similar
counter-argument against Posen’s unaltered application of security dilemma theory on ethnic
conflict is developed by Paul Roe (2004). In his critique of the ethnic security dilemma, Paul
Roe himself devalues the element of “unintentionality” within a security dilemma and argues
that a security dilemma can still arise within an ethnic conflict with malign intentions on one
or both sides (Roe, 2004, p. 288). Similarly, Snyder and Jervis take seriously the difficulty
involved in disentangling predatory motives from security concerns (Snyder, 1993; Saideman

& Zahar, 2008, p. 3).
Security fears are often intertwined with predatory goals which leads to a spectrum
of conflict situations (Snyder & Jervis, 1999). Security dilemma gives rise to predation (as
resources may become essential in defeating threats) while predation increases security
dilemmas (aggression leads to hostility and resistance and raises future issues of
accountability) (Snyder & Jervis). Besides, in most cases the assumption that both sides
want to avoid war and are willing to compromise, but cannot because they do not trust each
other, is flawed as information failures and commitment problems are irrelevant for so long
as hostile perceptions are rooted more deeply than information and commitment can reach
(Lake, & Rothchild, 1996, p. 41-75). Therefore, sometimes parties enter into a struggle for
positioning and control—a situation in which physical safety and access to power and
resources matches with the (perceived) necessity to transgress and dominate over others. The
analytical predictions between predation and security-seeking are not always clear, and in
fact the two can mutually reinforce each other (Levy, 2002, p. 254). Predation in conflict
generally describes a violently intrusive action aimed at obtaining gains using identity
politics. In other words, wars are mostly caused by “opportunities for primary commodity
predation” (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000, p. 26-27).
Predatory wars are most often understood as violence associated with profiteering
and access to natural resources and power, instigated by unscrupulous elites exaggerating
group grievances, recalling emotional fears of past occurrences, and arousing fears of
extinction and oppression regardless of a real or immediate threat to security (Kaldor, 2000).
First, as Snyder and Jervis point out, “it is often difficult to separate security-drivers and
predatory motivations, since long-term fears may drive security-seekers to take every
opportunity to exploit others in an effort to build up their reserve of strategic resources, even
when they face no immediate security threat” (Snyder & Jervis, 1999, pp. 15-37). Second, in
critical security junctures, offensive violence may be motivated by the anticipation of a
negative power shift and the fear of its consequences, which may similarly appear as
predation (Levy, 2002, p. 254). Hence offensive or as it may appear predatory violence in
typical security dilemmas may occur “when strategic conditions render aggression the most
advantageous form of self-defense” (Snyder & Jervis, 1999, p. 15). Therefore, predation in
security dilemmas cannot be solely understood as a pure desire for exploitation and
domination. This perceivably defensive or proactive type of predation, when clearly and
accurately portrayed as such, may associate convincingly with existing or prospective

security fears, and hence it may be understood as a preventive reaction to perceived threats.
This takes us finally to the concept of spiralling. The security dilemma deteriorates (spirals)
when two reasonably benign parties interpret each other’s self-proclaimed defensive-security
postures as being motivated by offensive aspirations (Booth & Wheeler, p. 5 & pp. 23-25).
In principle, an action or demand perceived as wholly defensive in nature by one group may
be seen as clearly predatory and offensive by another, leading up to actions that bring about
mutual insecurity causing inadvertent escalation and war.
Security dilemma thinking is prominent during negotiations for the institutional
accommodation of conflict (Downes, 2004). Problems with trust and intentions are critical
during phases of rapprochement as strong group solidarity, proximity, and the projected
magnitude of the military and political threat are likely to encourage groups to fear each
other. While a revised and adapted version of the security dilemma may be useful in
explaining the outbreak of ethnic conflict, it nevertheless shows weaknesses when applied to
explain security considerations and decisions in the negotiating phases of conflict, the stage
groups enter to decide and regulate their future by political means. Surely, the birth notion of
the security dilemma, assuming a situation where an effort to improve one’s security
decreases that of others, remains largely relevant throughout all phases of conflict, from
emergence and escalation to stalemate and regulation. For instance, Posen focuses mostly on
the first stage which may or may not lead to war (Posen, 1993a, p.103). Stuart Kaufman
likewise concentrates on this stage (Kaufman, 1999, p. 109). Chaim Kaufmann concentrates
on the third stage, forwarding a theory of how ethnic wars end (Kaufmann, 1996b, p. 137),
and Barbara Walter likewise focuses on the termination of civil wars (Walter, 1997).
According to Zartman (1997), parties decide to negotiate because they reach
stalemate. However, this study argues that the decision of parties to negotiate will not
entirely or necessarily diminish the fundamental tenets of the security dilemma. Most often,
warring parties enter negotiations with the whole load of bitterness, suspicion and fear built
at length during the conflict. As a result, parties will continue to interpret behaviour and
objectives with mutual fear and suspicion, turning the negotiation process into a firm contest
for political prevalence. This trail of behaviour reproduces the security dilemma well
through the post-military phases of conflict.
In a political context, however, the action-reaction spiral is relevant to the ways
groups perceive the intensity and meaning of postures, especially when one group’s
conceivably offensive security demands or actions are often met with another group’s

counter-demands and counter-actions, spilling into a vicious circle of aggravation, as well as
when efforts to reinforce one group’s bargaining position aggrandize fears of another,
triggering responses. In cases where security considerations are still in place but political
means have in many ways surpassed military solutions and the effects of a hurting stalemate
have gradually dwindled, group negotiators will naturally assess the costs of a dynamically
aggravating action-reaction spiral to the costs of defecting from the conflict resolution
process. Hence, fear, insecurity, and distrust will normally continue to cast their shadow
over efforts to resolve conflict, and hence positioning, competition, and cost-benefit
calculations will continue to influence decisions to act.
This may be particularly true for conflicts which are thought to be intractable:
conflicts which are highly resistant to a negotiated settlement, characterised by a
substantially long record of animosity, regular outbursts of violence, long and unproductive
phases of stagnancy and entrenchment, marked by intangible issues including identity,
sovereignty, and a history of failed peace-making (Putnam & Wondolleck, 2003). Yet,
calculations are no longer taking place for the military seizure of land or the military
suppression of the opponent, but rather focus on gaining access to political power and
resources, or imposing the restrictions that would help bridle the opponent. Under these
conditions, confidence-building measures have an important functional role to play,
especially during the pre-negotiation stage, but it is generally unlikely they will drastically
affect the competitive nature of the process itself.
In fact, not all security dilemmas escalate through the spiral to a situation of
competitive aggression and violent conflict. This is to suggest that the essence of security
challenges in non-militarily active conflicts may be the same as in military ones, or exert
similar influence on decisions made by groups, but in the rolling stage of negotiations
Posen’s deterministic account of inadvertent aggravation can be avoided because informed
political exchanges and formal channels of communication may presumably reduce risks of
uncertainty and abate misunderstandings. However, although negotiations can help parties
formulate a clearer picture of each other’s “wants and needs” and reduce the possibilities of
inadvertent aggravation, they will not necessarily ensure the merging of conflicting interests
or define a zone of possible agreement because parties will often bring into the process their
respective traumas, bitterness and bias, charging the negotiation process with questions of
commitment, fairness and trust (Fisher & Ury, 2011).

The Ethnic Security Dilemma in Cyprus
The present study scrutinises the indistinguishability of offensive and defensive
attitudes, the superiority of offensive over defensive action in responsive attitudes, and the
influence of existing windows of opportunity in order to define the political intensity of the
ethnic security dilemma in Cyprus and examine the precarious nature of strategic choice
during peace-making negotiations. Before doing so, we must first put the problem of Cyprus
into a context and sketch out a concise summary of the major security-related positions held
by the two parties.
Attributing the diachronic failure of negotiations in Cyprus to a specific cause or
dysfunction would be unwise. As far as we know, efforts reaching a negotiated settlement in
Cyprus are so far troubled by a number of apparent and less apparent obstacles, making the
entire venture particularly cumbersome. Broadly speaking, the apparent obstacles relate first
to the expected difficulties posed by administrative and state-building issues such as restoring
property rights for internally displaced people, accepting a whole range of participation
quotas and restrictions and making territorial arrangements, as well as defining the
constitutional character of the new state. These are the substantial issues of the negotiating
agenda. Equally apparent obstacles include the presence of the Turkish military forces on the
island and the lifting off of external security guarantees. The latter are generally regarded as
key questions and require sufficient concessions by third parties whose security interests may
be affected. Parties are well aware that every sector-related arrangement, which is to come
about following a comprehensive agreement, will tie parties to specific post-agreement
security conditions. Judging from their stated positions, both parties are deliberately seeking
to promote secure living conditions that will address their distinct “security needs” in a postagreement environment. In every single attempt to resolve outstanding issues, security lies
blatantly at the centre of concern for both ethnic communities. One possible conception
holds that problems with the Cyprus question descend from a holistic problem of security,
fuelled not so much by the problematic founding principles or technically inappropriate
arrangements of the proposed settlement, but by the fear and suspicion for the days following
an agreement. Fear of deception or misusage of provisions set by an agreement prompts
parties to maximize security demands and try to overpower each other in an attempt to
buttress their security defenses at the event of a possible break down.
Security considerations underpin negotiations and therefore drastically affect the
attractiveness of a compromise, as the security of one party is often seen to be working at the

expense of the other. As a result, negotiations stumble because parties assess the quality of
compromise solely on the supposed security conditions it entails, and then compare these to
their current security status. The dilemmatic situation is therefore split between the choices
of making painful but meaningful concessions to create a new idea of “security community”
in return for a perceivably “greater good,” or defect after competing to avoid a possible
deception. Thus, realizing a federal Cypriot Republic remains an option subject to the
merging of contrasting security considerations.
Although the two sides in Cyprus recognize the necessity of a federal solution, their
perspectives on the political outlook of the new state differ significantly (Berg, 2007, p. 213).
Greek Cypriots underline the importance of “rectification”, “integration”, “unity”, and
“independence”, seeking to bring about the island’s “unification” as means to reclaim their
suspended rights and reduce the military threat posed by Turkey through establishing a
bizonal-bi-communal system of joint governance for the two major communities on the
island.
Turkish Cypriots emphasize the idea of a new “consensual partnership” between
two politically equal people inhabiting two politically equal self-governing entities, by which
they can achieve equal representation, lift the constraints (embargo) imposed on them by the
international community, access resources across the island and attain legal status for the
currently non-recognized Turkish Cypriot entity (state). Hence, the different views on the
constitutional settlement of a Cypriot federation reflect the diverging notions of “oneness”
and “togetherness” held by the two communities.
For successive Greek Cypriot governments, the federalization of Cyprus is merely
seen as the constitutionally transformed continuation of the internationally recognized, and
Greek-Cypriot administered, Republic of Cyprus (Anastasiades, 2016). By contrast, Turkish
Cypriot leaders have insisted that by signing an agreement to federalize Cyprus, an entirely
new state will emerge, replacing the Republic of Cyprus in all respects (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.
82). Despite the seemingly legal nature of this variance, the question of where sovereignty
must lie is important for implicit reasons of state succession in the event of defection or
federal dissolution.
Beyond doubt, the two sides are pressing to secure the survival and legitimacy of
their respective state entities in the occasion of federal collapse. Greek Cypriot governments
see the federal-central state structure as the sole legal successor following a federal demise,
whereas Turkish Cypriots point to the “dual legitimacy” argument, according to which state

legitimacy is drawn equally from the two constituent states and whichever of the two states
decides to withdraw from existing federal structures, the state thereof ceases to exist, and its
powers should be therefore transferred to the constituent state entities (Burcu, 2016). Hence,
the two parties are faced with a question of sovereignty.
Turkish Cypriot centrifugal versus Greek Cypriot centripetal tendencies are not
merely shaped by experiences of the past or by habituation with existing realities alone.
Current insecurities and perhaps more importantly strategic considerations continue to shape
preference of one over the other. During negotiations both communities seek to safeguard
their prospective leverage and rights in a new federal consociation, so that “no community
would be able to dominate over the other or take the other one hostage” (Olgun & Rochtus,
2008, p. 114). Parties seek therefore to obtain mutual reassurances that will advance or
maintain their current security status. Indicatively, Greek Cypriot negotiators press for
constitutional assurances such as the vertical (hierarchical) structure of jurisdiction in the
new federal state, whereas Turkish Cypriot negotiators prefer the horizontal jurisdiction of
competencies in accordance with the principle of self-determination.
In sum, Greek Cypriot policy aims for a bi-zonal sovereign state with a strong federal
centre pressing for the removal of mainland Turkish settlers, the immediate withdrawal of
Turkish military forces, the reduction of third-party rights vis-à-vis Turkey (security
guarantees) and the adoption of the EU acquis communautaire across the island, without
exceptions. Turkish Cypriots seek to improve their security-autonomy status aiming for a
loose federal state with sovereignty status emanating from the two constituent entities and
defending strong veto mechanisms, third-party guarantees and equitability. In order to
appraise the theory’s exerted influence on Cyprus, this part of the study examines the
empirical magnitude and effect of indicators grouped in three separate sets typical of the
ethnic security dilemma theory.

(a) The Indistinguishability of Offensive and Defensive Attitudes
(i) Group Cohesion. Ethnic groups must first determine whether neighbouring
groups pose a threat (Posen, 1993a). During negotiations, the capacity to earn people’s
support for a particular security agenda, favourable to one group’s sense of security, could
place another group’s sense of security at risk, and this can be seen as offensive. Similar to
classical assumptions on the ethnic security dilemma, actions, statements and demands aimed
at protecting or enhancing one group’s perceived security interests are interpreted through a

lens of fear and suspicion, making it particularly difficult to distinguish the malign or benign
nature of one groups’ intention.
As Van Kuppevelt accurately explains, “It is of mere importance to the security
dilemma to view ethnic groups as cohesive and organized actors, as it is the ability of an
ethnic group to act as a cohesive unit that poses a threat to its neighbouring ethnic groupings”
(Van Kuppevelt, 2012, p.30). Hence, the security dilemma approaches ethnic groups as
unitary actors and expects groups to act homogenously in the face of security challenges.
Consequently, fear and insecurity between groups with opposing security interests may
strengthen in proportion to the perceived sturdiness and homogeneity of the bond between
groupness and security. The two groups in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are
divided along distinct linguistic, religious and territorial lines, forming two separate political
constituencies. Yet when political ideas of security coincide with the supposed welfare of a
community, to the perceived detriment of another, a perception of fear is created. The level
of popular consensus signifies popular support for a stated group attitude on security. Hence,
the more an ethnic group is seen or understood to operate as a “single and coherent” entity,
the more fear it may create to the opponent group. Indicative are the opposing views held by
political parties and their supporters across the divide on matters central to the shaping of a
federal Cyprus, such as on the constitutional makeup of the new state and state-building
(Beyatli, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2015).
(ii) History of Rivalry. A history of armed clashes or bitter rivalries between
groups increases the tendency of groups to perceive each other as offensive threats (Posen,
1993a). Retracting to historical records of rivalries and emotional or magnified narratives
influence groups in assessing the offensive implications of another group’s continuing
ambitions during the negotiations stage (Wertheim, 1996). Indeed, the history leading up to
the partition of Cyprus is close as possible to a textbook case of security dilemma-driven
behaviour (Lindley, 2007, p. 236). Outright inter-group hostilities emerged during the
Greek-Cypriot-led armed struggle for independence (1955-1959) between the Turks and the
Greeks in Cyprus, escalating into full-blown hostilities shortly after the island gained
independence. Security considerations in Cyprus have been largely shaped by a decadeslong record of fear, suspicion and conflict marked by numerous failed peace-making attempts
and critical third-party political and military interventions.

(b) The Superiority of Offensive over Defensive Action
(iii) Presence of “ethnic islands. Isolated ethnic groups can produce incentives for
offensive action if one side has (or believes itself to have) an advantage that will not be
present later (Posen, 1993a). Although primarily applicable to military interpretations on
offensive action, the existence of “ethnic enclaves” is of important strategic value, serving as
an offset to demands on the table, especially on issues pertaining to autonomy rights. Before
the Turkish invasion in 1974, the two ethnic groups lived scattered all over the island,
creating a patchwork of ethnic enclaves. Since then, ethnic groups have been living
separately in two highly exclusive and homogenous ethno-territorial domains. Today, there
is no substantial ethnic intermixing between the communities across the divide, and no
substantial “ethnic islands.” Ethnically mixed areas, especially in the capital Nicosia, had
once become hotspots of intercommunal riots and served only to increase general political
tension. Today, the absence of interface areas has made it very difficult for the two ethnic to
clash on the communal level.
(iv) Presence of small bands of “fanatics.” Historically, Greek and Turkish
Cypriot ultra-nationalist paramilitary groups helped provoke the escalating inter-communal
hostilities on the island, and their role was critical in the configuration of the current division
in Cyprus. If nothing else, the division of Cyprus has been instrumental in pacifying the
daily confrontations between armed groups, and it has therefore contributed decisively to the
absence of armed spoilers and fanatics. Moreover, ever since the island’s division, there
have been no active nationalist-paramilitary groups aiming to derail negotiations. Despite
the absence of extra-constitutional paramilitary groups, Cyprus remains heavily militarized
with the two ethnic communities facing off against each other across the truce line.

(c) Windows of Opportunity
(v) Anticipated shifts in relative power. Groups calculate their current position
relative to each other and make judgments about their relative power in the future (Posen,
1993a). Adjusting the classical ethnic security dilemma proposition on relative power into a
context of negotiations, we may argue that “if those with greater advantages expect to remain
in that position, then they may see no window of opportunity, and therefore shall remain firm
to their positions. However, if they expect their advantages to wane or disappear, then they
will have incentive to solve outstanding issues” (Posen, 1993a, p. 10).

Developments in Cyprus and the region have increased levels of insecurity and
aloofness in both sides. The extraction, management and distribution of energy resources
lying within the Greek Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have offered a considerable
diplomatic asset to the Greek Cypriot side. To ensure access to currently Greek Cypriot
administered resources, Turkish Cypriots need entering into an agreement with their Greek
Cypriot counterparts, creating pressure on the Turkish Cypriot breakaway entity for a deal.
Acting to reinforce the position of the Turkish Cypriot entity, Turkey has refused to
recognize the Republic of Cyprus’ exclusive legal right to extract and utilize resources lying
within its declared EEZ prior to a solution of the Cyprus Question. Turkish objections
against Cyprus’ EEZ have culminated into frequent threats and contestations of the Greek
Cypriot energy extraction zones. Greek Cypriot governments have responded by
strengthening defensive-diplomatic relations with Egypt, Greece and Israel, and have
continued nurturing their long-standing relations with Russia (Zeiger, 2013; Kyriacou, 2014;
Reback, 2015; Mekel, 2016).
In our view, this action-reaction spiral is typical of a security dilemma moving
beyond the actual battlefield, affecting thus the negotiation process. On the one hand, the
defensive-military balance on the island, formed after the stationing of the Turkish military
forces in Cyprus, appears to cling more favourably to the Turkish Cypriot side, but on the
diplomatic level, Greek Cypriots have so far used their legal and political leverage to control
the consequences of division, and pressurize Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots into making
concessions.
(vi) Expected Third-Party Intervention. The possibility of hegemonic third-party
actors intervening in situations of crisis, altering the balance in favour of one group versus
the other is creating a situation of fear and insecurity (Posen, 1993a). Admittedly, a sequence
of political and military interferences by Greece and Turkey amplified internal confrontations
leading up to the eventual division of Cyprus. After the 1974 Turkish military invasion of
Cyprus, the permanent military presence of Turkey on the island, alongside with the
economic and political dependencies, created between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot
community, have magnified Greek Cypriot concerns over the role played by Turkey in the
protection and consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot breakaway entity. The fear stemming
from previously traumatic third-party interventions could accurately explain Greek Cypriot
objections to accepting the reinstatement of security guarantees (and interventionist rights)
granted to third parties (Greece, Turkey and Britain) on Cyprus.

(vii) Large number of conflicts and crises in the international environment. The
large number of regional wars and crises may present a twofold effect on security-related
concerns during negotiations. Regional wars, crises and geopolitical fluidity are thought to
be affecting the positioning of groups during negotiations, such as by altering an existing
balance of power. Presumably, regional conflicts and crises affect regional shifts of power,
influence the formation of alliances and determine political leverage to the advantage or
disadvantage of parties. Hence, a regional reshuffling of power may either make parties
more resistant to concessions or encourage them to embrace more cooperative responses.
Cyprus is virtually surrounded by a series of volatile hot-spots, including Syria, South
Eastern Turkey, Israel-Palestine and Egypt, countries in which both Turkey and the Republic
of Cyprus have an interest.

A Theoretical Matrix on the Cyprus Negotiations
The variables set above point to the existence of a medium-scale security dilemma
(five out of seven variables exert an influence on security considerations). Quite
paradoxically, peace-making negotiations take place under a perceived threat of
subordination in the event of a precarious settlement. The ethnic security dilemma is thus
formulated according to the new security considerations influencing decisions to accept or
reject a settlement under the current UN-framework for a federal-consociational, bi-zonal and
bi-communal political system in Cyprus aiming to replace the current ethno-territorial
dichotomy (S/Res/649/1990 & S/Res/716/1991). The key question is whether the perceived
security status of the two communities could improve following a negotiated solution.
To answer this question, we have designed a prescriptive gain-loss framework
integrating outcome-evaluations for respective gains and losses framed along the lines of a
typical “negotiator’s dilemma” (Lax & Sebenius, 1992). The negotiator’s dilemma stems
from the difficulties of negotiation, namely facing off against an opponent with goals which
are opposite, and possibly contradictory to another’s. Hence, negotiators face a dilemma in
deciding whether to pursue a cooperative or a competitive strategy.
What essentially distinguishes the negotiator’s dilemma from its closely related
“prisoner’s dilemma” is the capacity of parties to communicate, and their increased ability to
shape and control the process by claiming (competing) or creating value (cooperating) (Lax
& Sebenius, 1992). In value-claiming approaches, negotiators work primarily to claim the
largest share of available resources (“fixed pie”). Conversely, value-creating approaches

seek primarily to expand the spectrum of available resources and create new possible gains
(“enlarged pie”) from which all parties will benefit (Lax & sebenius, 1992, p. 50). However,
effective competition undermines the realization of joint gains whereas a cooperative
approach can make one party vulnerable to the hard bargaining tactics of a competitor ((Lax
& Sebenius, 1992, p. 50). Hence, problems of decision arise from the tension between
cooperative and competitive strategies.
The effects of different framing games have been found in security dilemmas
(Kramer, Meyerson, & Davis, 1990). In the present study, perceived rational outcomes are
framed in a specific paradigm, in which decision outcomes are expressed in relation to the
relative gains and losses they entail. Yet it is important to recognize that how one
approaches the dilemma depends intimately on the paradigm through which one understands
and interprets the negotiation process. The study is concerned with the effects of a gain-loss
framework, according to which cooperative or competitive behaviour necessarily entails
gains and losses weighed against each other in order to produce a desirable equilibrium
between benefits and concessions. Furthermore, outcomes arise from the confluence of one
party’s decisions with the decisions of the other (Kelley, & Thibaut, 1978). This is to
suggest that desirable outcomes depend not so much on the prospective benefits of an
agreement (“eyes on the prize”), but on the outcomes judged with respect to weighing the
perceived gains and losses in accordance to the other party’s likely behaviour (cooperative or
competitive) (De Dreu & McCusker, 1997). Hence, parties judge outcomes by defining the
effects of competition and cooperation on their perceived gains and losses. To put it simply,
parties evaluate outcomes in accordance to the gains and losses compared to their current
state of affairs and accordingly define their behaviour during negotiations. This line of
reasoning suggests that an agreement between parties must increase current gains without
incurring costs that greatly exceed the costs of not having an agreement. Thus, the value of a
settlement rests on whether its supposed gains outweigh the significance of losses compared
to the current state to which parties have adapted, known as reference point, and hence this
depends not on whether but on how an agreement shall be ultimately reached.

Table A: Gains and Losses for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots per Action

Gains-Losses per Action

Greek Cypriot

Turkish Cypriot

Gains – Cooperating
(+α)

Ending Turkey’s military
presence
Territorial Reunification
(conditional)
Retrieving land
Property Compensations
Avoiding risks of adversarial
interferences
Avoiding risk of post-agreement
defection
Reducing risks of third party
interferences
Risks of exerting adversarial
interferences
Risk of post-agreement
defection
Risk of hostile third-party
interferences

Self-determination - legal
recognition (limited)
Accessing valuable resources
Lifting EU entry suspension
Accession of Turkey to EU
(conditional)
Avoiding risks of adversarial
interferences
Avoiding risk of post-agreement
defection
Reducing risk of subordination to
majority group
Risks of exerting adversarial
interferences
Risk of post-agreement
defection
Increasing risk of subordination
to majority group

Division and military occupation
Conflict of interest
Risk of international recognition
of Turkish North (in case of
defection)

Continuation of political and
economic isolation
Conflict of interest
Loss of access to valuable
resources
Blocking accession of Turkey to
EU (conditional)

Gains – Competing
(+β)

Losses – Cooperating
(-χ)

Losses – Competing
(-ζ)

Lax and Sebenius (1992) apply the negotiator’s dilemma as such: if both parties cooperate
they will both receive a good outcome (win-win). If one cooperates while the other competes,
the cooperative party will get a terrible outcome, while the competitive party will receive a
great outcome (win-lose). If both parties compete they both will get a mediocre outcome.
The negotiator’s dilemma holds that both parties are better off if they both cooperate because
they will both get good outcomes, as opposed to mediocre or terrible outcomes (Lax &
Sebenius, 1992, pp. 49-62). We could thus prescribe three prevalent outcomes: i) win-win, a
case in which both sides cooperate and are better off than without an agreement (gains
outweigh losses), ii) lose-lose, where both sides lose by competing and are worse off without
the agreement, and iii) win-lose, one side wins by competing, and the other one loses by
cooperating. Notably, an additional possibility appears when both sides lose by competing,
but are better off without the agreement (costs of agreement higher than costs of defection).

Hence, as Lax and Sebenius succinctly explain:
In the face of uncertainty as to the other’s choice of strategy, each side’s
best choice is to compete. They will either get the great outcome, or avoid a
terrible outcome and get a mediocre outcome. If the other is
cooperating, the first side actually has an incentive to compete. Of course,
when each party follows this reasoning and adopts the competitive strategy
they both end up worse off, with mediocre outcomes. (Lax, & Sebenius,
1992, p. 52)
Under conditions of uncertainty over one party’s real intentions, the best choice for each
player is to compete while the other party cooperates (great outcome), the second best choice
is mutual cooperation (good outcome), the third best is mutual defection (mediocre outcome),
and the worst case is to cooperate while the other party defects (terrible outcome). Hence, if
both parties rationally decide to compete in order to maximize their gains, the “dominant
strategy” (the best strategy independent of the move of the other side) is to compete because
one gets the best instead of the second best, or the third best instead of the worst result.
Hence, if both players compete, they just get the third best result instead of the second best
for mutual cooperation. Using this logic, the best strategy is to compete, so that parties end
up with either a great or mediocre outcome. A competitive strategy will allow parties to
either receive a maximum reward or, provided the other party similarly decides to compete,
control losses by not making concessions. Yet by deciding to defect, both parties end up
with mediocre outcomes. In this inescapable, yet often paradoxical context, negotiating
parties work primarily to claim:
…the largest share of the disputed goods…negotiators engage in hard
bargaining; they start high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value of
concessions, minimize the benefits of the other’s concessions, conceal
information, argue forcefully on behalf of principles that imply favorable
settlements, make commitments to accept only highly favorable agreements,
and are willing to outwait the other fellow. (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, p. 50)
We can nevertheless make two relevant observations with this recommended approach.
First, knowing that in the face of uncertainty as to the other’s choice of strategy, each side’s
best choice is to compete, parties will either get a great outcome, or avoid a terrible outcome

and get a mediocre one. Even more so, if one party’s cooperative approach translates into a
sign of weakness, the other party has an additional incentive to compete. Sometimes,
cooperative intensions could be well regarded by opponents as signs of weakness,
encouraging thus the adoption of offensive and more antagonstic postures. Yet if each party
follows this reasoning and adopts the competitive strategy they both end up worse off, with
mediocre outcomes. Thus acting on a rational calculation of their individual best interests
causes the parties to forego cooperative gains, and potentially leaves them worse off than
they could have been (Lax & Sebenius, 1992, p. 50). Secondly, gains are not independent
from losses. Admittedly, there is no such thing as “pure gains” since gains are usually
received in return for concessions, and deciding to compete does rarely imply that parties
will not need to make significant concessions in order to receive pay-offs. Cooperation
therefore occurs within a competitive context, though one in which gains received outweigh
the costs of concessions. Thus, assessing the relative costs of stalemate in conjunction with
the relative gains of a negotiated settlement is crucial for adopting a cooperative response to
negotiations. By contrast, if parties assess the concessions and losses of a negotiated
settlement to outweigh the costs of stalemate, they could thus judge they would live better off
by coping with existing security threats without a negotiated settlement (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991, p. 106).
Interestingly, this tendency for loss-aversion, or the idea that losses loom larger than
equivalent gains, has been clearly noted and described in Kahneman’s and Tversky’s
“Prospect Theory” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Results of human decision-making
research are generally consistent with the notion of loss-aversion (Budescu & Weiss, 1987;
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler 1990; Schneider & Lopes, 1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991;
Camerer, 2000; Bleichdrodt, Pinto & Wakker, 2001). More recently, Gill and Prowse (2012)
have provided experimental evidence that loss-aversion could become more salient within a
competitive environment.
As Tversky and Kahneman argued, loss aversion implies that “a given difference
between two options will generally have a greater impact when it is evaluated as a difference
between two losses…than when it is viewed as a difference between two gains” (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991, p. 1045). Thenceforth, the fact that losses are more dissatisfying than
equivalent gains implies that losses loom at least twice as large as equivalent gains, and all
outcomes in a loss-framed negotiation should be multiplied by two (De Dreu, & McCusker,
1997). This is an important factor when the individual faces the decision of whether to leave

the interdependent situation (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). The larger the difference in
utility between two behavioural options (cooperate vs compete), the more obvious it is what
to choose and what strategy to pursue (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In loss-framed negotiation
dilemmas, defection seems the dominant strategy from the individual’s point of view.
In real context negotiations, elements of insecurity, unfortunately, encourage
competitive strategies, while taking a cooperative approach makes one vulnerable to the hard
bargaining tactics of a competitor (Lax & Sebenius, 1992). In the case of Cyprus, we could
assume that if both parties cooperate they could sufficiently increase their security. If one
party cooperates while the other party competes, the cooperative party will see its security
levels reduced while its competitor will receive a far better outcome. If both parties compete,
or ultimately defect, they will receive a mediocre security outcome by defecting. This,
however, should be only regarded as a possible scenario given that benefits and losses in real
negotiations are less clear. We have designed a matrix where joint outcomes are maximized
when both participants cooperate (3), personal outcomes are maximized if one participant
competes while the other cooperates (5, 0), and if both participants compete end up with a
mediocre outcome (1). Thus, from the participant’s perspective and under conditions of
uncertainty, competing is the dominant strategy because it maximizes one’s own gains or
minimizes one’s own losses (Dawes, 1980; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978).
Table B: Cooperate vs. Compete Matrix
TC1 = Cooperate

GC1 = Cooperate

GC2 = Compete

3, 3
(Reward for mutual cooperation)
5,0
(Temptation to defect, and “sucker’s
payoff”)

TC2 = Compete
0, 5
(“sucker’s payoff”, and temptation
to defect)
1, 1
(Punishment for mutual defection)

If one assumes that negotiating parties seek to prevent losses, then we are presented with a
loss-aversion strategy, or the idea that losses loom larger than equivalent gains (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This is to suggest that losses are counted as
more important to prospective gains, and thus, concessions for cooperation would become
significantly more hurtful to the cooperative party in case the other party persistently
competes, which makes it even harder for a party to cooperate in the first place irrespective
of the other party’s initial strategy.

Table C: Gains and Loses
Outcomes

Prospective
Gains

Prospective
Losses

5

-3

Both Parties Cooperate

3/3

-2

Both Parties Compete

0/0

-2

One Party Competes, other Party Cooperates

Hence, we are presented with the following range of loss-aversion choices: if both compete
0/0, if both cooperate 3/3, and if one competes while the other cooperates 5 / - 3. Equally
consistent with the analysis are findings from negotiation studies that showed that lossframed negotiators demand more, concede less, and settle less easily than gain-framed
negotiators where the value of gains is evaluated higher than the costs incurred from losses
(De Dreu, Carnevale, Emans & Van de Vliert, 1994).
At some point, negotiating parties in Cyprus will be faced with an eventual “make or
break” dilemma. As highlighted above, negotiating vital security matters under conditions of
uncertainty and under a loss-centred approach embolden the adoption of risk aversive
positions, and thus negotiations could be deadlocked. First, it may be more likely that parties
will defect in case they decide that their current gain-loss equilibrium is preferable to the
damages incurred by the prospective costs and gains of a settlement. Secondly, a similar
conjecture may emerge in case where both parties signal their desire to cooperate but are
paralysed by the dreadful influence of possible deception and distrust.
We could suggest a possible escape route for reducing the level of uncertainty in
Cyprus and breaking up with the paralytic influence posed by loss-centred approaches. Most
importantly, both parties in Cyprus need to acknowledge the idea that some uncertainty is
unavoidable, before and after a negotiated settlement. Then Cypriot negotiators may be able
to deliberately manage the existing levels of uncertainty by addressing vital areas of concern
through mutual gurantees, monitoring processes and binding commitments, and if possible,
by enlarging the “pie of possible gains” and creating new value. Emphasis, for example,
could be placed on the mutual satisfaction of fundamental needs and wants expressed by the
two parties. These could include major areas of interest which are deemed non-negotiable
(e.g., human security and human rights) and areas reflecting practices and norms contained
within international law. The furtherance of value-creating bargaining approaches can help
parties mitigate the influence of uncertainty by trading-off risks with reasonable benefits to

the point they overcome the effect of costs. Reaching the point where cautious risk-taking on
important concessions happens in return for previously unforeseen gains is crucial for
negotiators to counterpoise the cost of risks and win public support.

Conclusion
In view of the two parties’ stated positions, the analysis adopted a non-military
version of the ethnic security dilemma to explain the antagonistic attitudes in efforts to
ensure sufficient political control and security in a post-settlement Cyprus. Major aspects of
the security dilemma in ethnic conflict, such as the indistinguishable intentions of groups,
increased group loyalty and cohesion, a history of rivalry, the role of third parties, anticipated
shifts in relative power and the large number of conflicts and crises in the international
environment, are evident in Cyprus.
Through the lens of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict, the study recreated a
typical “negotiator’s game” to account for the likely choices made under the influence of
antagonistic security considerations on the negotiation process in Cyprus. The fear and
suspicion induced by the security dilemma works primarily at the expense of a solution,
transforming the negotiating process into a competitive cost-benefit problem marked by
distinct security considerations, pushing parties towards the adoption of protective measures,
which may be seen as offensive by each other.
The analysis puts forth a set of possible strategic options in relation to the perceived
gains and losses they entail. Using a loss-aversive negotiation model, the analysis suggests
that despite the stated eagerness of parties to resolve the Cyprus question, they will most
probably operate reservedly under a veil of uncertainty; as a result of fear and suspicion
induced by the security dilemma, losses are evaluated higher than the prospective gains of a
settlement. Hence, although parties would be better off by cooperating, the utility of current
gains and the fear of prospective losses on security could instead prompt parties to compete,
or eventually defect in order to preserve valued gains and prevent losses in exchange for
prospective gains. Parties may become increasingly resistant to a compromise entailing
giving up their established gains to incur themselves with costs which are seen as
disproportionate to the “security value” of prospective benefits. Essentially, bi-communal
negotiations, and the proposed institutional arrangements in Cyprus could gradually become
hostage to crude security considerations, blurring prospects for a mutually propitious solution.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that corresponding gains and losses may not be
equally important, or valued equally by the two sides, and thus, gain-loss correlations could
be varyingly prioritized or measured by the two communities and their leaders. Therefore,
loss-aversion and gain-oriented approaches should be separately tested on each group. This
methodological suggestion is worth investigating for future research on the Cyprus statebuilding negotiations.
Although it may be difficult to eliminate completely the propensity towards lossaversion in security-seeking strategies involving concensual and competitive exchanges,
there still exists a possible way to reduce the influence of loss-framed approaches and
encourage the adoption of more constructive security-seeking strategies. The idea of
motivating parties by “creating value” is central to reducing the perceived weight of losses.
By “enlarging the pie” of potential gains and spreading it across new sectors of opportunity
and beyond the normative and predictable agenda, the scope of possible convergence could
increase, to the point where additional prospective gains will encourage parties to make more
mutual concessions.
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